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COMMENTS
CREDIT CARDS-A SURVEY OF THE BANK CARD
REVOLUTION AND APPLICABILITY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In the fall of 1966, several midwest banks launched a new credit card
system. In order to enroll as many cardholders as possible, the banks not
only invited applications for these cards, but also mailed the cards to per-
sons who had not applied for them. This unsolicited mailing resulted in
some unfavorable publicity and legislation was proposed to curb the dis-
tribution of these cards. The publicity was the result of the inevitable con-
sequences of any blanket mailing, while the legislation was a kind of reflex
action of an aroused public's representatives. All this sound and fury led
to some basic questions being asked about the need for and operation of
credit card systems. This comment will attempt to answer these questions.
It is the purpose of this comment to explore the unique structure of the
Midwest Bank Card (MBC) system and its impact upon the meager exist-
ing law on this topic. This lack of jurisprudence was not detrimental to a
determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties under a two party
credit card system. But, it is not sufficient to meet the complexities of tri-
partite credit cards or the more intricate MBC system. The possible legal
theories which might be applied to controversies arising under the MBC
system will be explored with special emphasis upon the effects of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in this area.
It is important at the outset to distinguish the various credit card plans.
The two party credit card is the simplest arrangement, whereby a retailer
issues credit cards to a select group of customers and subsequently allows
these cardholders to pay for merchandise at a later date or by installments.
Such a system is governed by the ordinary rules of contract and is not dis-
cussed in any depth in this comment. The three party or tripartite credit
card plan is more complex. Perhaps the best example of such a system is the
credit card of any major oil company. The company provides credit cards
for its customers and these cards enable them to charge purchases and
services at any of the company's dealers. Of course, if the retail outlet is
company owned, then this plan is really a two party credit system; if the
outlet is independently owned, the plan is a tripartite system. The Mid-
west Bank Card (MBC) system is a variation of the tripartite credit card
and has distinguishing characteristics. The tripartite credit card will only
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be discussed in this comment when what is said of the MBC system is
likewise applicable.
UNIQUE STRUCTURE OF THE MIDWEST BANK CARD SYSTEM 1
There are many bank credit card plans presently in operation in this
country. Any bank may enroll into its plan as many merchants and retail-
ers as it wishes who agree to honor the bank's credit card when presented
by a purchaser and to also accept payment from the bank less a discount.
This type of plan is not limited to banks and its branches, but is used on a
national and international scale by American Express Co., Diners' Club,
Inc. and many of the major oil companies. Under this plan, any one trans-
action for goods or services involves only three parties: the issuer, the
merchant and the cardholder. The credit card system employed in the
Midwest Bank Card (MBC) system is unique because (1) there are more
than three parties involved in a single transaction, and (2) the various bank
cards are compatible.
The MBC system was initially founded by five Chicago banks who be-
came members of Midwest Bank Card System, Inc.2 At the time of this
writing, there were twelve banks (referred to as system banks) who were
members of this corporation, banks from Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan.
The corporation is the owner of the distinctive symbol that appears on
every MBC card, regardless of which bank issued the card, and it has es-
tablished and regulates a clearing house that processes the charge sales
slips used by the merchants. The MBC system considers these charge slips
to be "items" as that term is defined in Article 4 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.Y These system banks are comembers of the corporation but are
competitors in enrolling merchants and soliciting cardholders. If the MBC
system involved only these twelve system banks, merchants and card-
holders, it would still be unique because of the compatibility feature of
the cards. Even if a merchant has been enrolled by one of the twelve sys-
tem banks, he will honor a card that was issued by a different system bank.
However, the system banks are limited, not by the terms of the corporate
regulations, but, strictly in terms of geography and practicality, as to the
number of merchants they might enroll. The MBC system allows a system
bank to contract with another bank (referred to as a participating bank)
I The information in this section which pertains to the structure of the Midwest Bank
Card system was obtained through an interview with Mr. Robert N. Hampton, Vice-
President, FirstCard Department, The First National Bank of Chicago, in Chicago, Feb-
ruary 15, 1967.
2 Continental Illinois National Bank, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, The First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago, Central National Bank in Chicago, Pullman Bank and Trust Co.
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 4- 104(g). "'Item' means any instrument for the pay-
ment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
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whereby the latter agrees to conform to certain rules and procedures of
the MBC system and either share in the discount or receive a fee directly
from the merchant for charge slips purchased from the merchants depend-
ing upon the particular system bank involved. The participating bank may
then enroll merchants and solicit cardholders. At the time of this writing,
there were approximately eight hundred banks participating in the system.
As a result of this expanded system, there may be as many as sixteen parties
directly or indirectly involved in any one transaction. For example, Mr.
Cardholder has a card given to him by B Bank, a participating bank, who
has a contract with C Bank, a system bank. Mr. Cardholder buys merchan-
dise from Mr. Merchant who was enrolled by E Bank, a participating bank
in privity with F Bank, a system bank. The item is processed through a
clearing house regulated by Midwest Bank Card System, Inc., in which C
Bank and F Bank and ten other banks are members.
The MBC system is a complete innovation in credit card concepts and a
substantial variation of tripartite credit cards. The relationship of the par-
ties in a two party credit card system does not apply to the MBC system
and much of what was said regarding the tripartite credit card system is
likewise inapplicable. An examination of the relationship of the parties in
the MBC system is the topic of the following section of this comment.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES
The focal point of this section shall be an investigation of the legal rela-
tionships of the principal parties, issuer, cardholder and merchant, and, as a
corollary thereto, the derivative rights and liabilities of each as determined
by a direct and indirect application of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Only two theories have been proposed thus far as to the relationship of
these three parties. One court has likened the credit card transaction to the
factoring of accounts receivable, 4 and one writer has proposed that it is
something closely akin to a commercial letter of credit.5 In this section,
both theories and their correlation to the MBC agreements will be dis-
cussed. The procedure that will be followed is a comparative analysis of
certain basic elements from which conclusions can be drawn as to the ap-
plicability of one theory or the other to the MBC system.
The initial discussion must be centered upon the ultimate purpose of
each party in entering into any one of the relationships to be discussed.
The essential premise shall be that all potential purchasers of goods would
rather do business upon a credit rather than a cash basis. The conclusion
then follows that all sellers who wish to stay competitive must of necessity
4 Uni-Serv Corp. v. Frede, 50 Misc.2d 823, 271 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1966).
5 Comment, 48 CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (1960).
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engage in selling on credit.6 The purpose of each one of the relationships is
to facilitate this demand for credit while at the same time alleviating the
inherent risks of selling on open account. Thus, while each method of fi-
nancing has the same initial purpose, it is the methodology that is the dis-
tinguishing feature. The factor of accounts receivable accomplishes this
purpose by contracting with a seller of goods on open account whereby
he effectuates an outright purchase of all the accounts receivable at a speci-
fied discount. In return he makes available to the seller a drawing account
from which the seller has access to immediate cash.7 In this fashion, it is
the factor who assumes the risk of bad debts and eliminates tedious and
expensive bookkeeping problems for the seller. The legal result of such a
transaction is an assignment of the accounts receivable.
8
The method used in letter of credit financing bears no resemblance to
that of factoring. In this case, the seller, not wanting to rely on the buyer's
personal credit, suggests to the buyer that he procure a letter of credit,
which is defined as "an engagement by a bank or other person made at the
request of a customer ... that the issuer will honor drafts or other de-
mands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit."9 In this way, the seller relies solely upon the credit of the issuer,
and the buyer has an effective credit instrument at his disposal. In the
MBC system, the procedure is somewhat similar to that outlined for a let-
ter of credit. The buyer, desirous of purchasing goods on credit, but whose
credit standing is not established with the particular merchant, obtains a
credit card from one of the MBC system banks. By the presentation of this
card, the cardholder is allowed to purchase goods without the necessity of
producing ready cash. As in the letter of credit situation, the merchant is
not relying upon the credit of his immediate customer, but upon the bank
with whom he has contracted. Thus, the method used to insulate the mer-
chant by the use of a letter of credit or the MBC system occurs before the
underlying sales contract is formed, while in the factoring of accounts re-
ceivable, the sales contract is formed prior to the financing arrangement.
A second area to be considered is the separate undertaking of the parties
when they enter into such an arrangement. Regardless of the type of
agreement which is to be employed, the purchaser of the goods undertakes
to pay for the products or services rendered, according to a specified ar-
rangement, at some time in the future. Also essential to all three agree-
ments is that the purchaser is ultimately going to pay someone other than
6 Moore, Factoring-A Unique and Important Form of Financing and Service, 14
Bus. LAw. 703 (1959).
7 Id. at 706. 8 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 149 (1932).
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-103 (1) (a). Hereafter the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 Official Text, with comments, will be cited as U.C.C.
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the merchant. By an assignment of accounts receivable, the merchant (as-
signor) undertakes to sell bona fide accounts, and the factor (assignee)
undertakes to purchase these accounts at an agreed discount. 10
This sale of accounts receivable is a transaction covered by Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions: "this Article
applies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the
jurisdiction of this state... (b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights, or
chattel paper."" An account is defined as, "any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an in-
strument or chattel paper ...,12 and instrument is defined as a negotiable
instrument, or a security or any other writing which evidences a right to
payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a
type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with
any necessary indorsement or assignment.' Thus, any future discussion of
rights or duties of one engaged in a factoring agreement will be based upon
Article 9.
The engagement of the issuer of a letter of credit varies materially
from that of the factor. The issuer's obligation is defined as an engagement
to honor drafts drawn upon it or, "that the bank has been ... authorized
to honor.' 4 Any future discussion of the rights of parties involved in a
letter of credit agreement will be subject to Article 5 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which governs the operation of letters of credit.
The engagement of the issuer of an MBC credit card is more difficult
to determine. The contract with the merchant, whether by the issuer or a
participating bank, does not call for the purchase of any accounts receiv-
able, and in fact there is doubt as to whether an account receivable is cre-
ated at all since the transfer of the item might be considered payment, and
the issuer does not promise to honor drafts drawn upon him. The terms of
one contract specifies that the issuer is to:
grant final irrevocable credit in respect of sales slips (items) generated through
the use of the Bank Card which are deposited with Bank.
While the specific operations are not the same, conceptually the issuer's
engagement resembles that of an issuer of a letter of credit, in that there
is provided an institution with a high credit rating who assumes a primary
obligation to pay for the goods or services, predicated upon the presenta-
tion of certain documentation.
Perhaps the major distinction between factoring and a letter of credit
is the aspect of the "privity concept" a term which may be defined as,
10 Moore, supra note 6, at 706.
11 U.C.C. § 9-102. See also U.C.C. § 9-502 and comments.
12 U.C.C. § 9-106. 13 U.C.C. § 9-105 (g). 14 Moore, supra note 6, at 706.
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"mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property."' 5 This
"privity concept" is the foundation of the assignment of accounts re-
ceivable agreement. The assignee acquires whatever rights the assignor
had as regards the basic underlying contract of sale.16 In reality, the under-
lying sales contract is the sine qua non of the entire financial agreement.
The "privity concept" is foreign to letter of credit financing. This point
was aptly stated by one commentator: "A letter of credit is a contract.
It is distinguished by the fact that it is inevitably linked to another under-
standing, usually also a contract, but is independent of that other under-
standing or contract."'1 7 Thus, the basic distinction that must be made
relates to this concept of privity. The factoring agreement is a contract
dependent upon the underlying sales contract. On the other hand, the
letter of credit is an independent contract which must, "be construed
within its own four corners.' 8
Examined from this aspect of privity, the MBC system appears to involve
independent sets of contracts closely resembling those of a letter of credit.
The issuer enters into a contract with several customers and simultaneously
enters into separate contracts with a number of merchants. Neither of
these contracts is dependent upon the existence of an underlying sales con-
tract for a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties. Their
respective rights and duties are determined by the particular agreement.
Thus, in the area of privity, the letter of credit analogy again gains more
credence.
Another significant area for comparison is the obligation of the ultimate
party (assignee-issuer) to the purchaser of the goods or services. The
general rule of law is that an assignee takes subject to all defenses and
counterclaims good against his assignor until notification of the assign-
ment has been given to the principal obligor.19 In order to avoid this
consequence, the merchant-purchaser contract often contains a waiver
of defenses by the purchaser against the assignee. This waiver is validated
by the Uniform Commercial Code, subject to any state laws to the con-
trary.20 Since the underlying sales contract is the basis for the assignment,
it is only reasonable that the assignee be subject to any defenses or counter-
claims to it.
The issuer of a letter of credit, however, is invulnerable to defenses
that arise under the sales contract: "An issuer's obligation to its customer
. unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or responsibility [a]
15 BLAcx, LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (4th ed. 1951).
16 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 149 (1932).
17 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. ch. 621 art. 5-101 (McKinney 1964). See also U.C.C.
S 5-114, comment 1.
18 Ibid. 19 U.C.C. § 9-318. 20 U.C.C. § 9-206.
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for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction
between the customer and the beneficiary .... -21 The issuer's sole
obligation to its customer is determined by the contract between them.
The theoretical basis for the rule is that the issuer has no control over
the making of the underlying contract or over the selection of the bene-
ficiary.22 Each cardholder agreement used in the MBC system has a spe-
cific clause disclaiming all liability on the underlying sales contract by the
issuer. If the analogy to a strict letter of credit is accepted, the presence
of the clause is superfluous. However, an examination of the theory be-
hind the issuer's immunity perhaps discloses the reasoning of the MBC
banks in including such a provision. The proposition that the issuer of an
MBC has no control over the underlying sales contract fails upon an
examination of the merchant-bank contract which details the exact pro-
cedures to be followed by the merchant with regard to every credit card
sale. The requirement that all merchants must lease the bank's imprinting
machine, check circulated lists for stolen cards and obtain approval for
all purchases over a certain amount, are'indications of control. However,
this control does not extend to the quality of the merchandise sold and
the control theory is weak in this respect. Of greater force is the fact
that the issuers have complete control over the selection of the bene-
ficiaries (merchants) of these cards, since only those merchants in a con-
tractual relationship with the MBC system can accumulate the "items"
necessary for presentation and payment. Thus, an argument can be made
that sufficient control of the underlying sales contract is present so as to
make the bank liable for breaches of that contract, without an express
disclaimer.
Therefore, a comparative examination of certain basic aspects of the
relationships of the principal parties discloses almost no resemblance to a
factoring of accounts receivable arrangement, although there is a marked
resemblance to the letter of credit theory as applied to the financing of
domestic rather than foreign sales transactions. The analogy is enhanced
by an examination of specific requirements laid down in the Uniform
Commercial Code for an instrument to become a letter of credit, in that
the credit must require a documentary draft or demand for payment. 23
A documentary draft is defined as, "one honor of which is conditioned
upon the presentation of a document or documents. 'Document' means any
paper including document of title, security, invoice, certificate, notice
of default, and the like."'24 In the MBC.system the merchant, as mentioned
previously, in order to secure a final credit, must present an "item" for
deposit, an instrument that could fall within the ambit of this definition.
21 U.C.C. § 5-109. 23 U.C.C. §§ 5-102(1) (a).
22 U.C.C. § 5-109, comment 1, 24 U.CC. § 5-103 (1) (b).
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The major conclusion that can be drawn from the above examination
is that a court in deciding litigation involving the MBC system, whether
it finds that the cards create a de facto letter of credit relationship or not,
cannot adequately determine the respective rights and liabilities of the
parties without first examining the article on letters of credit within the
Uniform Commercial Code and the basic principles which that article
encompasses. A second conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no
basis for finding that cards of this type create an assignment of accounts
receivable relationship when compared with the concepts which are
embodied in the basic agreements.
SELECTED CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
The following section shall be concerned with and limited to an exami-
nation of the contractual provisions which will most likely interest the
legal profession in assessing any rights or liabilities of any of the parties.
As it is the intention and purpose of this comment to present an overall
picture of the MBC system, with special emphasis upon the relationship
of the parties and the application of the Uniform Commercial Code
thereto, the discussion that follows can only cover selected provisions
of the typical contract and the law pertaining to these particular clauses.
It must be noted that no one agreement contains all the provisions which
will be discussed, however each individual agreement does contain a sig-
nificant proportion of the following terms and conditions.
One provision which appears is:
By the retention or use of the [credit] card issued by the bank, the cardholder
agrees to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
Can one be subjected to the terms of a contract, and liable for the breach
thereof, by merely retaining the card, without even using it? To make
such a determination it is necessary to examine the rules pertaining to offer
and acceptance.2 5 The general rule is that one need make no reply to an
offer, and that mere silence or inaction will not amount to an acceptance.2 6
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances the law will imply an accept-
ance from the offeree's failure to reject the offer.27 According to Professor
Williston, one such circumstance is: "Where the offeree takes or retains
possession of property which has been offered to him. ' '28 Under this doc-
trine, one who receives an unsolicited credit card and thereafter leaves
25 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 91 (Students ed. 1938).
26 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 73 (1963); see also 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 91 (Jaeger
1957).
27 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 26.
28 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 25.
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it on his desk, without anything more, would be subject to the terms of
the contract since his retention constitutes an acceptance.
The Restatement of Contracts, however, has limited this theory to in-
clude only those offerees who have exerted dominion and control over the
proffered property.29 To illustrate these concepts, the Restatement offers
the following two examples:
A sends B a one volume edition of Shakespeare with a letter saying, 'If you
wish to buy this book send me $6.50 within one week after receipt hereof,
otherwise notify me and I will forward postage for return.' B examines the
book and without replying makes a gift of it to his wife. B owes A $6.50.
The facts being otherwise as stated (above), B examines the book and without
replying carefully lays it on a shelf to await A's messenger. There is no con-
tract.
30
From the foregoing illustrations, it can be inferred that the mere possession
of an unsolicited credit card will not be deemed an acceptance of the
contract. However, if the offeree goes further and signs his name to the
card, he should be said to have exerted the necessary dominion and con-
trol over the property so as to have accepted the contract.3 1
Each issuer-cardholder agreement contains a specific clause denying
liability on the part of the issuer for disputes between the merchant and
the cardholder. A representative example is:
Issuer has no responsibility for merchandise or services purchased by the cus-
tomer with (card) ... and customer agrees to pay issuer for all credit purchases
even though a dispute may exist.
The question as to whether such a right of setoff or counterclaim exists
has been discussed in the section on the relationship of the parties under
the Uniform Commercial Code, since the existence or nonexistence of
such a right is necessarily dependent upon the relationship that is created.
This present discussion will center on the question of what effect the
waiver of liability has, assuming such a right of setoff does exist.
Waiver has been defined as "the voluntary . . . relinquishment of a
29 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72 (1932). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACT1S
§ 72 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); U.C.C. § 2-607.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS, supra note 29. at illus. 7-8.
31 See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 351 (1965), wherein it is provided that "unless
otherwise agreed . . .if .. .unsolicited goods are either addressed to or intended for
the recipient, they shall be deemed a gift to the recipient, who may use them or dis-
pose of them in any manner without any obligation to the sender." This statute does
not in any way alter the conclusions stated in the text because: (1) without any indica-
tion of acceptance there is no obligation running from the recipient to the sender; and
(2) if the recipient acts so as to accept the offer, he has agreed to be bound by the
terms of the contract which provides that the card shall remain the property of the
issuer, and has thereby nullified the effect of the statute.
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known right, claim, or privilege. ' '3 2 A person to be capable of a valid and
effective waiver of his rights must be of legal age, and sui jurisA33 The
legal effect of such waiver is that the party so doing is henceforth pre-
cluded from asserting such a right.34 A right arising under a contract may
be waived,3 5 including a right to assert any defenses.36 This view is con-
tinued, and even broadened, in the Uniform Commercial Code which
provides for waiver of any claim or right even without consideration,
if it is in writing and signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.3 7 The
conclusion is that if the holder has a right of setoff or counterclaim, he
may waive that right and by so doing cannot assert it in defense of any
action by the issuer.
Another interesting aspect of these cards is the inclusion of a warrant
of attorney to confess judgment. One agreement states:
Cardholder irrevocably empowers an attorney of any court of record to appear
for the cardholder in any court, in term time or vacation at any time hereafter,
and confess judgment without process against cardholder on this agreement
in favor of the bank for the amount of said indebtedness, including interest
and service charges costs and 15% of the amount of such indebtedness as attor-
ney's fees, and to waive and release all errors which may intervene in any such
proceedings, waive any rights to appeal from such judgment and consent to im-
mediate execution thereon, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney
or attorneys may lawfully do by virtue hereof. Cardholder waives personal serv-
ice of such execution.... Void where prohibited by law.
A majority of the states uphold the validity of these clauses, although
many invalidate them as a matter of public policy. 8 Illinois is one state
which upholds these clauses, with certain procedural restrictions, such as
place of venue 3 and additional requirements which must be met before
a "Deduction Order summons" may issue.40
This same clause however is void in Indiana, which declares any cog-
novit clause to be void if in a contract to pay money.41 This statute how-
ever, has no extraterritorial effect and applies only to the execution of
3228 AM. JUR. 2d 24 Estoppel and Waiver S 154 (1966).
33 Potter v. Fahs, 167 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1948).
34 Accord, People ex rel. Bygland v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Child. Ct. 1954).
15 Bellaire Sec. Corp. v. Brown, 124 Fla. 47, 168 So. 625 (1936); People v. Police
Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 450, 67 N.E. 78 (1903).
36 Supra note 32, at § 162.
37 U.C.C. § 1-107.
88 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1724 (Rev. ed. 1938).
•9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 50(4) (1965).
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 62 S 82 (1965).
41 IND. STAT. ANN. ch. 29 S 2-2904 (Burns 1966).
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the instrument in Indiana. 42 Michigan, another state in which these credit
cards have been disseminated, treats these clauses as valid with one re-
striction, that the clause must be printed on a separate and distinct instru-
ment from the contract to be confessed.43
The issuers have also inserted a provision whereby in collection pro-
ceedings, they may offset the bank deposit of the cardholder against his
indebtedness:
In any such event, any and all indebtedness due from the issuer to customer
may be offset and applied in satisfaction of customer's indebtedness.
This right has always existed with regard to bankruptcy proceedings ini-
tiated against a bank's depositor.4 4 In interpreting the applicable section
of the Bankruptcy Act, the court in Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust45
held that "generally, a bank may apply the debtor's deposit on his debts
to the bank as they mature. '46
Even outside the bankruptcy setting however, a bank has the right to
setoff a general deposit to pay any debt due to the bank from the deposi-
tor.4 7 This view has been accepted in Illinois, where the appellate court
has held that when a depositor of a bank is indebted to that bank, the
bank may apply the funds to cover the indebtedness. 48 As Mr. Tiffany
points out in his treatise on banking, this right of setoff can only be used
against matured debts;49 however, a recent case has allowed such setoff
for an unmatured debt. 50
If this setoff can only be accomplished with respect to matured debts,
then a cursory examination is required of the clause permitting the is-
suer to
allow the total outstanding balance to become due and payable at once, if
at any time the holder of the sales slips shall feel insecure.
42American Furniture Mart Bldg. v. W. C. Redmon, 210 Ind. 112, 1 N.E.2d 606
(1936). See also 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1724 (Rev. ed. 1938).
43 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2906 (1962.).
44 Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1963). "In afl cases of mutual debts or mutual
credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated
and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed
or paid."
45270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Ribaudo v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank of Orlando,
261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1959); First Nat'l Bank of Negaunee v. Fox, 111 F.2d 810 (6th
Cir. 1940); Corbett v. Kleinsmith, 112 F.2d 511 (6th Cit. 1940).
46 Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, 270 F.2d 823, 836 (1959).
47 TIFFANY, BANKS AND BANKING §§ 19-21 (1912).
48 Home Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 8 Ill. App. 563, 565 (1881).
49 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 47.
.
50 Ames Trust & Savings Bank v. Reichardt, 254 Iowa 1272, 121 NN.V.2d 200 (1963).
See Annot. 7 A.L.R.3d 900 (1966).
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According to Professor Corbin, these clauses are held to make the acceler-
ation optional with the creditor, this meaning that he has the power to
advance the due date by giving notice or upon the occurrence of some
overt act, with the privilege of exercising this option or not at his will." '
The clause is phrased in terms of election, since most courts in interpreting
them have imposed an election requirement regardless of the absoluteness
of the provision. 52 The unmatured debt can therefore become matured at
the option of the issuer. A clause such as this inserted in a negotiable
instrument can only be exercised in good faith,53 and it must be assumed
that this requirement should be judicially integrated in this situation so
as to avoid unconscionability.
A final clause which might lead to litigation is the clause authorizing
termination at will, a clause most often found in exclusive dealership agree-
ments. Such provisions are not illegal per se;54 however, in many instances
they are unenforceable since the person in whose favor such a clause runs
is not bound to do anything, and thus the contract fails for lack of mutual-
ity and consideration.5 5 If, however, an independent consideration can be
found, they will be upheld.56 Since many of these contracts allow either
party to terminate at will, it can be said that each promise is sufficient con-
sideration to support the other.
Thus, in conclusion it can be said that no one clause standing alone,
with the possible exception of the cognovit clause, is unduly harsh or one-
sided. However, taken as a whole, a court could not be criticized for
finding the contract unconscionable. In view of this prospect, many of the
issuers might use their unilateral right of modification of the terms of the
contract to balance the obligations encompassed in such a contract.
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CREDIT CARDS
Because of a fear of bad publicity, credit card issuers do not normally
sue their cardholders whose cards have been lost or stolen and subsequently
used by a thief to purchase merchandise. 57 No matter what the reason,
51 IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 265 (1963) and cases cited.
52 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2025 (Rev. ed. 1938) and cases cited.
53 U.C.C. § 1-208.
54 Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1953).
55 Strobe v. Netherland Co., 245 App. Div. 573, 283 N.Y.Supp. 246 (1935).
56 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 105 (Rev. ed. 1938).
57 There have been some startling accounts of spending sprees of credit card thieves.
See for example Porter, How to Guard Against the Credit Card Thieves, Chicago
Daily News, Dec. 21, 1966, p. 37, col. 1:
"Three Long Island housewives went on a shopping spree and billed $16,000 worth
of merchandise to stolen credit cards.
"A Pittsburgh gambler had $10,000 in his pocket when arrested by police-most of
it refunds from airline tickets he had bought with other people's credit cards.
"A credit card thief posing as a health-center operator ran up bills of more than
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the fact is that there are few cases on the subject. Because of this dearth
of case law, it is important to view the cases there are, and attempt to
categorize these few in order to arrive at what, at most, is only a deter-
mination of the options available to a court hearing a case of first impres-
sion involving the unauthorized use of credit cards.
By the terms of the underlying contract between the cardholder and
the issuer, the holder either agrees to assume the risk of any loss or theft
up to the time when he notifies the issuer of loss or theft, or he does not.
This general statement however is subject to further modification because
a cardholder may agree to assume responsibility for loss or theft only to
a certain limit. In determining liability for any unauthorized use, the
cardholder-issuer contract must be examined first. If there is no agreement
by the cardholder to assume this risk, he is not liable unless he is pre-
cluded from denying that the use was authorized. The first court deciding
a case involving credit identification devices reached the opposite conclu-
sion under a theory that the charge coin of a department store was similar
to a negotiable instrument. 58 This rather astounding theory was aban-
doned and completely rejected in subsequent litigation involving charge
coins.59 In these cases the coin was looked upon simply as a means of
identification. The presentation of the coin indicated that the customer
had acceptable credit and that goods could be delivered to him without
further credit investigation. Up to this point in the development of the
law, a holder of any credit identification device was only liable for au-
thorized uses of that coin or card. A Pennsylvania court later added that
a holder might be liable even for an unauthorized use if he were pre-
cluded from denying that the use of the card was authorized.60
At the present time most credit card agreements contain a clause ex-
pressly stating that the holder will pay for any use of the card, authorized
or unauthorized. 61 Just what effect this clause had was not agreed upon
$10,000 at gas stations by promising attendants health courses if they would make out
phony bills against the credit card and give him the cash."
58 Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778, 779 (1915). The court viewed the coin
as being "in effect an order upon the plaintiff to deliver goods to the person presenting
it, and to charge the said goods to the defendant's account. It is similar to a check,
a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument payable to bearer."
59Jones Store v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931), Lit Brothers v.
Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (1923).
60 Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (1935). In this case the card-
holder was negligent in not notifying the issuer after he became aware that his card
had been lost or stolen.
61 The card of a leading oil company states: "Customer agrees to pay for all pur-
chases made by any person, whether authorized or not, using this card unless and
until [issuer] has received written notice that it has been lost or stolen."
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by the courts which faced the problem. Four courts have interpreted these
risk-shifting clauses and two clear cut variations have evolved. In Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan6 2 the credit card holder loaned his card
to a third party who refused to return the card and subsequently pur-
chased fuel with it. The holder did not notify the oil company of the theft
of the card. While the court could have decided the case on the basis of
the holder's negligence, the court found for the card issuer on the basis
of the contract saying that the holder had obligated himself to be respon-
sible for all purchases made with his card and was therefore bound to pay.
The fact that the holder was admittedly negligent clouds the issue some-
what and it is unfortunate that the court did not verbalize its opinion in
terms of the negligence of the holder. The two diverse schools of thought
relative to the interpretation of the agreement to pay for unauthorized
use grew out of the facts in each situation. While the holder was negli-
gent in the McMillan case, 3 the merchant was negligent in Gulf Ref.
Co. v. Williams Roofing Co. 64 The Williams Roofing Co. applied for and
received eight credit cards from the issuer.65 The holder typed the words
"Good for Truck Only" on the front of each card. A service station at-
tendant retained possession of one of these cards and left the state to
begin a ninety day spending spree. Faced with a criminal act of a dealer
of the issuer, the court was reluctant to apply the finding of the Mc-
Millan court that the holder was bound to pay, even when confronted
with the expressed assumption of the holder to pay for all merchandise
obtained by any person who presented the card. The court found that
the dealers of the issuer assigned their rights to the issuer and once it
made this determination it could have decided the case solely on the basis
of assignment principles. The dealers were negligent in selling merchan-
dise to the thief who presented a card marked "Good for Truck Only"
but was driving a passenger automobile. The holder then could use the
defenses against the assignee that were available against the assignor.66
Granted that the issuer might have argued that even if the dealers were
negligent and the holder had defenses against them, the agreement to
assume full responsibility for all purchases prevented the holder from
62 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App . 1943). The credit card in question contained the
following clause: "The named holder shall be responsible for all purchases made by
use of this card, prior to its surrender to the issuing company, whether or not such
purchases are made by the named holder or into the card described."
63 Ibid.
64 Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
6 Id. at 369, 186 S.V.2d at 794. The reverse side of the cards provided that the
holder "assumes full responsibility for all merchandise, deliveries or service obtained
on credit by any person by its presentation."
66 Supra note 64, at 367, 186 S.W.2d at 794.
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asserting any defense, but the holder could have countered that the agree-
ment did not encompass assuming responsibility for purchases that re-
sulted from the negligence of the dealers. In any event, the court construed
the contract as one of guaranty and determined that the person who ex-
tended the credit must do so in good faith "subject to any limitation ap-
pearing on the face on the card. '6 7 From these two cases developed two
theories that evolved from the facts peculiar to each case. One theory
held that the contract binds the holder to pay in all events, while the
other held that the holder must pay only if the issuer and merchant act in
good faith and are not negligent. The latter theory was enforced and
amplified in Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Lull.68 Before any further discussion
of this case, it must be pointed out that in Lull, like Williams, the dealer
was negligent. In Lull, the card was issued in Oregon but the thief was
driving a car licensed in Idaho. As the court in Williams, the Lull court
found the contract of the holder to be one of guaranty but amplified the
"good faith" of Williams by imposing upon the merchant and issuer the
affirmative duty to exercise reasonable diligence to protect the guarantor.
The most recent case, Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein,69 adopts the theory of
strict compliance with the contract. However, once again the issue is mud-
died by the facts because in Goldstein the holder was negligent in not
reporting the theft of his card. The Goldstein court expressly distin-
guished the contract before it from the one in the Lull case and refused
to call such a contract one of guaranty. In effect the court refused to
place any affirmative duty of diligence upon the issuer whom it felt was
so totally removed from the actual confrontation of the customer and
seller that any required diligence would have been impossible to exer-
cise.70
It becomes impossible to extrapolate any isolated rule of law regard-
ing liability of the holder for unauthorized use that is unfettered with
any fact situation that does not limit its application. The most that can
be said is that the courts up to this point have held the holder liable when
he has been negligent and have refused to grant recovery to an issuer
whose dealers were negligent, even though the recovery or denial of re-
covery have been couched in terms of the contract between the parties.
But even this statement leads to the conclusion that when negligence is
67 Supra note 64, at 368-69, 186 S.W.2d at 794. In other words, while the cardholder
was bound by the terms of the agreement the issuer and the dealers were bound by the
terms of the cardholder which he typed on the card.
68220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
69 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962). See Note, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 150 (1962),
wherein the case is analyzed.
70 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Lull, supra note 69, at 754-55, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
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not at issue the terms of the contract will govern. 71 If the contract is at
issue, the only difference in application of the two theories is that by fol-
lowing the theory in Lul 72 it would be incumbent upon the issuer to prove
the exercise of reasonable diligence while the need for such proof is missing
from the theory of the Goldstein73 case.
The cardholder agreements used in the Midwest Bank Card system con-
tain risk-shifting clauses74 and what has already been said about such
clauses applies to these agreements. When the Chicago banks began this
system, both system banks and participating banks mailed credit cards
to their customers, and this unsolicited mailing can result in liability for
unauthorized use. Once a contract is made and the card is lost or stolen,
even if the holder had never used the card, the holder will be bound by
the terms of the agreement.7 5
As was indicated in the section on the unique structure of the MBC
system, the banks view the sales slip as an "item" and as such it falls with-
in the Uniform Commercial Code. 76 If this "item" is the actual payment
for the purchases, the thief of any MBC credit card actually gives a non-
negotiable instrument to the merchant as the quid pro quo for the merchan-
dise. This aspect of unauthorized use is discussed further in the following
section.
EFFECT OF ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE U.C.C.
The sales slip used by the MBC system has space for the entry of
quantity, description and price of merchandise sold. This sale history
takes up one half of the sales slip, but the other half is of importance for
this discussion. There is space for the imprinting of the name and card
number of the holder. Beneath this space appears the following:
71 What has been said about the risk-shifting clauses presupposes that they are valid
and will be applied according to ordinary contract law. One writer suggests that since
these clauses are not generally known to be in the contract, the provisions of liability
must be specifically brought to the cardholder's attention. See Comment, 13 STAN.
L. REV. 150 (1960). Another commentator posits that credit card risk shifting clauses
should be interpreted by analogy to those factors involved in interpreting exculpatory
clauses. See Comment, 22 LA. L. REv. 640 (1962). See also Uni-Serv Corp. v. Frede,
supra note 4. In this case the court suggested that the extent of liability of the card-
holder should be limited to the credit limit imposed by the issuer. If the issuer put a
$250 limit on the credit available to the holder, the holder's liability for unauthorized
purchases should not exceed that limit.
72 Supra note 68. 73 Supra note 69.
74 One such clause reads: "In addition, Cardholder agrees to pay for all purchases
and Instant Cash advances made by or to any person presenting one of Cardholder's
cards prior to its surrender to Issuer or Issuer's receipt of written notice that the Card
has been lost or stolen."
75 See discussion in text pp. 391-95.
76 U.C.C. § 4 -104 (g). See definition supra note 3.
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I hereby authorize the Issuer of the Midwest Bank Card imprinted above to
pay the amount shown as Total hereon upon presentation hereof to Issuer
by a bank which is a member of the Midwest Bank Card system. I hereby
promise to pay said Issuer the amount shown as Total hereon (together with
other charges due thereon, if any) subject to and in accordance with the terms
of the cardholder agreement governing the use of Issuer's Midwest Bank Cards.
Below this paragraph is a line for the customer's signature. The MBC
system treats these sales slips as "items" under Article 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and has established a clearing house for their process-
ing.77 "Item" is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as "any instru-
ment for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but
does not include money." '
The item performs an important function and it must be examined in
any discussion that purports to investigate the MBC system. It has already
been mentioned in the section on the structure of the MBC system that
the compatibility is a unique aspect. This compatibility is accomplished
through the clearing house that processes the item and through the function
of the item itself. It must be pointed out that the cardholder is obligated to
the issuer by the terms of the contract existing between the parties. Keeping
this in mind, the following interpretation of the legal status of the item and
the corollary implications thereof is offered.
The main function of the item is to transfer money in terms of credits
and debits. The merchant takes the item to the bank that is in privity with
him and receives a credit. The item is then forwarded to the MBC system
clearing house where it is paid by the issuing bank.
The first sentence of the two that appear on the item (sales slip) is an
authorization given to the issuer by the cardholder to pay the MBC sys-
tem or participating bank which presents the item. It is posited that this
language makes the item a three party instrument in the nature of a draft
and places it within the terms of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The item is clearly nonnegotiable because it lacks words of nego-
tiability; 9 however, nonnegotiable instruments are encompassed by the
Code if they are not payable to order or bearer but are otherwise nego-
tiable.80 The "authorization to pay" sentence of the item conforms to
this provision and it is contended that the "promise to pay" sentence is
mere surplusage that does not preclude the item from being within the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The cardholder, as has
been pointed out, is already obligated to the issuer by the terms of a pre-
existing contract and any promise of the cardholder to pay the issuer is
of no legal significance since he is already legally obligated to do so.
77 Specific reference to these slips as "items" is also made in the contract between
the bank and the merchant.
78 U.C.C. § 4-104(1) (g). 79 U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (d). 80 U.C.C. § 3-805.
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Working on the basis of what has been hypothesized, several conclu-
sions can be drawn. By the terms of the merchant-bank agreement, the
bank agrees to:
grant [the] merchant final, irrevocable ...credit in respect of sales slips
["items"].
The merchant, in effect, agrees to deliver merchandise to the cardholder
and to accept a nonnegotiable instrument for which the bank agrees to give
final credit. By granting such final credit to the merchant, the bank in
which the merchant deposits these slips becomes a holder for value.81
Upon transferring the instrument to the bank the merchant makes war-
ranties to the transferee bank both by the terms of the merchant-bank
contract and by the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code. 82 According
to the merchant-bank agreement, one such warranty is that the merchant:
has no knowledge that the signature on the item is unauthorized.
However, the warranty of the Code is much more positive in that the
transferor warrants that "all signatures are genuine or authorized. '83 The
merchant-bank agreement does state that except as privided in the agree-
ment:
the bank shall have no recourse against merchant on any item nor shall mer-
chant have the liability of an endorsor.
But the fact is that the merchant does not endorse the item and his war-
ranties are given only to his immediate transferee. 84 In addition, it can
be questioned if "no recourse against merchant on any item" is sufficient
language to constitute a waiver of an action on the warranty.85 Perhaps
any action by a bank against a merchant or by a bank against a bank
would be commercial suicide. Consequently a discussion of any litigation
is somewhat moot; but such an action is possible, and indeed, when and
if the MBC system is firmly established as an indispensable part of the
midwest business world, the sensitivity of the banks to adverse publicity
may not be so great.
When the cardholder presents the signed "item" in exchange for mer-
chandise, the merchant by a pre-existing contract with an MBC bank has
agreed to accept that item as payment, relying on the bank's engagement
to pay him for all items deposited. The item then serves a dual purpose.
It discharges the cardholder from his obligation to the merchant on the
underlying sales contract. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that
when an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation, the obligation
81 U.C.C. 5 3-303.
82 U.C.C. S 3-417(2). 84 U.C.C. " 3-417 (2).
83 U.C.C. S 3-417 (2) (b). 85 U.C.C. § 3-417 comment 1.
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is not discharged but only suspended pro tanto until payment.8 But this
does not appear to be the effect of payment by "item" in the MBC system.
The merchant does take the instrument but the cardholder has not au-
thorized the issuer to pay the merchant. The cardholder has authorized the
issuer to pay the MBC bank which presents the item for payment. By a
collateral agreement, the item is of value :0 the merchant because he can
receive cash for it by depositing it with the appropriate bank. Relying
on the executory promise of the MBC bank to honor all items deposited,
it is posited that the merchant at the time of sale discharges the cardholder
of his obligation under the sales contract.
In addition to operating as a discharge of the cardholder, the item is
evidence of his pre-existing undertaking to pay the issuer the amount
shown on the item. When an MBC credit card is used by an unauthorized
person, he is the one who signs the name of the true cardholder to the
item. According to the Uniform Commercial Code, an unauthorized signa-
ture "is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed
unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it ...."I87 The signature
however operates as the signature of the unauthorized user.8 8 The fact
that the "item" evidences a debt of the unauthorized user lends credence
to the theory that these risk-shifting clauses are contracts of guaranty.8
However, viewing the item in its capacity as an authorization to pay, the
risk-shifting clause becomes a contract of indemnity because the MBC
bank by a collateral agreement is bound to honor the item rightfully pre-
sented for payment. In other words, by the unauthorized use, the issuer
has become liable to the presenting bank on the item and the holder
agrees to make good the loss resulting from that liability.90 As indicated
in the preceding section, if the contract is determined to be one of guar-
anty or indemnity, an affirmative duty of reasonable diligence is thereby
imposed on the issuer.
CREDIT CARD LEGISLATION
Shortly after the initial promotion of the MBC system, the Illinois
General Assembly convened. Several bills were introduced that affected
the distribution or use of credit cards. 91 One provides for a penalty of
$500.00 for the unsolicited distribution of credit cards.9 2 Another bill
limits the liability of cardholders. In the instance where the card is un-
86 U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b). 87 U.C.C. § 3-404(1). 88 U.C.C. S 3-404(1).
89 See discussion in text on "Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards," pp. 400-404.
90 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 5 (1945).
91 S.B. 180, S.B. 189, S.B. 190, S.B. 194, 75th I11. Gen. Ass. (1967).
92 S.B. 189, 75th 111. Gen. Ass. (1967).
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solicited, the cardholder is not liable for unauthorized use unless he has
signed the card or otherwise indicated his acceptance.9 3 On the other
hand, when application is made for the card or acceptance of an unsolicited
card is indicated, the holder's liability for unauthorized use is limited to
$150.00.9 4 A fourth bill completely prohibits the issuance of any card
unless written application has been made for the card and provides that
the issuer insure the cardholder or hold him harmless for the first $1,000.00
of charges made by an unauthorized user of the credit card.95 If a thief
used a credit card to purchase $10,000.00 worth of merchandise, under
one bill the holder would pay $150.00 and the bank $9,850.00. By the
terms of another, the holder is insured for the first $1,000.00 but must
pay $9,000.00. Ironically, in the absence of any statute, by the terms of
the agreement, now in use by two of the MBC system banks, if a thief
charged 10,000.00, the holder would pay $50.00 and the bank 9,950.00. If
there were no credit cards and a person earned $10,000.00 in cash on a busi-
ness trip, his out of pocket loss by the theft would be $10,000.00.
Credit and credit cards are an important and vital part of the present
state of commerce. Statutes should not impose a penalty on a bank which,
in the interest of convenience, issues a credit card to a customer rather
than cash. The statutes should make it mandatory that card issuers make
holders aware of the clauses in agreements that allocate the risk of loss.
One cardholder agreement has this risk-shifting clause in type so small
that there are thirteen lines to one inch. If in fact the risk of loss is to
be shared, this term in any contract should be brought to the attention
of the holder by being set out in bold print or in larger size type. I" Not
only should these risk-shifting clauses be highlighted, but the extent
of liability for unauthorized use should be limited to the credit limit im-
posed by the issuer, and such credit limits should appear on the card. Any
proposed legislation should realistically evaluate the place of credit in
this modern age and rather than attack the issuer, should lay ground rules
whereby the public can appraise fairly the proposed contract without
being surprised at some future date to learn of the true extent of con-
tractual liability.
The legislative concern over unsolicited credit cards is not warranted.
The issuer itself is willing to assume the risk that the card might be sent
93 S.B. 190, 75th Ill. Gen. Ass. (1967). This is a statutory enactment of what liability
would be limited to even in the absence of the statute.
94 Two of the system banks in recent advertisements have announced that no holder
shall be liable in excess of $50 for any unauthorized use. The banks reacted to public
opinion in a more positive way than the legislature. Of course, with a statute, the
permanency of such self insurance plans is not guaranteed.
95 S.B. 180, 75th I11. Gen. Ass. (1967).
96 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512 (1961).
